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The Duties and Rights of Operators
Of Water Retention Structures
I. INTRODUCTION
Eastern, or riparian, water law has been concerned primarily
with the allocation of a short supply of water.' In allocation cases,
courts have tried to reconcile the property theory of natural flow
(under which downstream owners have a right to have the stream
flow undiminished in quantity and quality) and the tort theory of
reasonable use (under which upstream owners can diminish the
flow of a stream "reasonably" without liability for damages and
free of the downstream owners' right to enjoin such diversions).
This conflict of theories is traced in the Second Restatement of
Torts2 and in such cases as Harris v. Brooks3 in which the Arkansas
Supreme Court expressly adopted the reasonable use theory to re-
solve a conflict between a boat rental user who wanted water left
in the stream and irrigators who wanted to make diversions of the
same water. It has been suggested that Harris v. Brooks may be
explained as a minimum level or minimum flow case because the
court resolved the conflict by prohibiting withdrawals by the irriga-
tors when the level fell below a stated point.4 Even though the rea-
sonable use doctrine was invoked-and presumably permitted di-
versions-the natural flow theory, and the property theory of natu-
ral levels played a limited role in fixing the minimum level.5
The following discussion will not be concerned with shortages,
but rather with cases in which the natural flow increased due to
heavy runoffs, and downstream owners sued the upstream operator
* S.B. 1949, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1952, Harvard University. Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Connecticut.
1. See generally 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGnTs (R. Clark ed. 1976).
2. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 850A and commentary (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1970).
3. 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
4. 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGiTs, supra note 1, § 615.2.
5. [W]e conclude that the Chancellor should have issued an
order enjoining appellees from pumping water out of Horse-
shoe Lake when the water level reaches 189.67 feet above sea
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of a water retention structure alleging that its negligent operation,
and not its failure,6 caused excess waters to overflow their lands.
If natural flow plays a significant role in fixing minimum flows
to allocate short supplies, it would be expected that natural flow,
even during heavy runoffs, might also play a role in fixing the max-
imum level (or flow through) that an operator may permit without
having to bear responsibility for damages caused by flooding down-
stream.7 However, an emerging series of cases involving the man-
agement of water retention structures suggests that there is no
right to have the natural flow pass through a structure. Under
these cases the duties of the operators of water retention structures
are being swept into the general expanded duty of care or reason-
ableness of general tort law despite the fact that the natural flow
was swollen by heavy runoffs, or perhaps, more accurately, because
the stream was swollen by heavy runoffs. It will be suggested in
this commentary that variations in the natural flow, including
heavy runoffs into a structure, should be looked to in order to deter-
mine the magnitude of permissible releases. That is, the tort issue
of negligent flooding should be viewed within a water management
scheme that uses natural flow to help fix maximum, as well as mini-
mum, permissible flows through structures.
If, as some of the cases suggest, the duty of the operators of wa-
ter retention structures is fixed by a pure and general duty of care,
then some consideration must be given to the possibility that a tort
duty to one set of downstream parties may conflict with the prop-
erty rights and duties to other sets of persons who may also be af-
fected. The difficult questions of how and by whom these conflict-
ing duties should be resolved, as well as how the conflict of duties
can be brought to the attention of factfinders, need careful thought.
level for as long as the material facts and circumstances are
substantially the same as they appear in this record. We
make it clear that this conclusion is not based on the fact that
189.67 is the normal level and that appellees would have no
right to reduce such level. Our conclusion is based on the
fact that we think the evidence shows this level happens to
be the level below which appellants would be unreasonably
interfered with.
225 Ark. at 447, 283 S.W.2d at 135.
6. For cases concerning failures, see notes 26-29 infra.
7. Cases which indicate that the operator of a hydroelectric dam has
no duty to operate the dam as a flood control structure (that is, waters
flowing in may be passed through) are collected in Baldwin Process-
ing Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 112 Ga. App. 92, 143 S.E.2d 761 (1965).
Baldwin is of interest in that it expressly refers to the natural flow
theory to support this rule. See also Key Sales Co. v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas Co., 290 F. Supp. 8 (D.S.C. 1968).
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Finally, if the duty of the operators of water retention structures
is generalized into a broad duty of care, it will be suggested in this
commentary that the issues in dispute may shift from negligence
to causation.8 Harm from variations in natural flow, as well as op-
erator negligence, may be the cause of damages to downstream own-
ers. Also, it must not be forgotten that the fault of the downstream
owners, or their predecessors, who have elected to use flood prone
areas may b'e a cause of their own damages.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Duty to 'Draw Down"
Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co.9 may well become a leading case
establishing a duty to draw down a reservoir when heavy runoff
is expected. In Utah Power, the operator of a structure defended
against downstream flood damage claims by showing that the water
leaving the retention structure was equal to or less than the water
coming into the structure. The natural flow doctrine would suggest
that no liability should attach in such circumstances; 10 however,
the court rejected this theory. Utah Power can be explained as a
case in which a duty to cut the crest of flooding grew out of the
defendant's prior skimming of the crests of earlier spring floods;
having once skimmed spring floods, the utility company had a duty
to skim future floods to protect downstream farmers who converted
from grass crops that could withstand flooding to crops that could
be damaged by flooding.
In the negligent floodings cases the defendant often argues that
the structure was not a flood control structure. This may be an-
other way of stating that there was no assumption of a duty to
try to minimize the effects of heavy runoff. The holding in Utah
Power indicates that the prior acts of the operator which conrol
floods are of more importance than either the self-characterization
of its operations by the defendant, or the duty of the operator to
maximize power generation capacity for its customers, at least to
the extent drawdowns were previously made.
8. Ansley v. Tarrant City Water Constr. & Imp. Dist. No. 1, 498 S.W.2d
469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (take-nothing judgment in suit for flood
damages affirmed on the grounds that even though the jury found
the acts of the defendant increased the flooding of the plaintiff's lands
already subject to flooding, the jury also found that the market value
after the construction of the structures complained of was the same
as before). Ansley shows an interaction of the causation and damage
issues.
9. 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. See note 7 supra.
322 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
It is not unusual for structures to be multi-purpose. The Corps
of Engineers may construct *a structure where others contribute
to the costs needed to make it larger than needed for flood control
so that it can provide storage for fish or be used as a water supply.
A portion of the pool, such as the top fifty-three feet, will be desig-
nated for flood control and the remaining portion of the reservoir
will store water for other users who contributed to the cost of the
structure. This was done in the Colebrook River Reservoir in Con-
necticut where the Corps controls the reservoir and makes releases
from the water supply portion upon request." A duty may rest on
the Corps to drawdown the flood control portion of the reservoir in
anticipation of heavy runoffs, 12 but it would appear that the Corps
could not drawn down the portion of the pool paid for by others
who contributed to the costs of the larger dam. The flood control
costs are borne by expenditures from the public treasury, not the
water rates paid by the customers of the water supply company,
whose funds contributed to the cost of a pool for water supply.
One view of the holding in Utah Power suggests that the prior
drawdown of the reservoir amounted to a dedication of a specific
portion of the pool to flood control purposes. However, it is diffi-
cult to envision a dedication of the entire capacity of the structure
to flood control purposes. Put bluntly, a duty to draw down a
structure should not result in a cost free transfer of storage capacity
from the principal purposes of those who paid for its erection to
the purposes of those downstream, especially when those complain-
ing of the failure to draw down include persons who-have granted
the utility flowage easements.'3 Previous drawdowns may them-
selves be a standard or measure of the portion of the reservoir ded-
icated to flood control, not an assumption of an unrestricted duty
to avoid flooding, even if greater drawdowns could have cut the
crest.
Perhaps the result of Utah Power is to "take," within the mean-
ing of the Constitution, reservoir capacity in excess of that pre-
viously used for flood control for the private benefit of the down-
stream owners. No reported case appears to have turned on the
taking issue; but water law is a strange mixture of property in its
absoluteness, and torts in its flexibility. Perhaps in future cases,
if the taking issue is raised, the argument that a given structure
11. The Metropolitan District has contributed to and is entitled to make
calls on a portion of the Corps project. See Letter from Albert Helt,
Deputy Manager of Water Engineering for the Metropolitan District,
to Clifford Davis (Nov. 7, 1977).
12. See notes 18 and 31 infra.
13. The effect of flowage easements granted by some plaintiffs in Utah
Power is discussed in the text accompanying note 49 infra.
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is not built as a flood control structure may be resolved as a matter
of property law instead of tort law.
Intertwined with the duty growing out of prior conduct in Utah
Power was the issue of whether the heavy runoff was foreseeable.
The heavy runoff was deemed foreseeable in Utah Power, so that
even though the waters released by the utility company did not
exceed the waters coming into the reservoir, the pass through of
flood water was no defense. This would indicate to plaintiffs seek-
ing to recover in such circumstances, that the key to finding a duty
may be establishing the foreseeability of heavy runoff. Even cases
which could be cited for the proposition that the operator of a struc-
ture has a right to permit waters to flow through or over the dam
in such quantities as they flow into it 14 seem to share a concern
with whether the heavy runoff was, or could reasonably have been,
anticipated. If it could not have been anticipated, there was no
duty to draw down the reservoir.
For the defendant operator concerned that the flows allegedly
mismanaged cannot be proven to have been unanticipated, there
is a suggestion in Key Sales Co. v. South Carolina Electric & Gas
Co.15 that the correlative duty to protect others, such as upper
riparians who will be affected by retarding the flow, may limit the
duties owed downstream owners by the operator of a water reten-
tion structure. 10 However, the willingness of courts to see the
broad picture and the fact that the management of a structure to
suit one plaintiff will adversely affect another may offer no defense
as a matter of law. At most, the recognition of conflicting demands
on the operator of the structure will suggest a ground for reversing
a verdict when the instructions fail to take such correlative duties
into account. One line of cases which might be helpful is railroad
crossing cases in which the motorist, injured at the crossing, alleged
that the train could have stopped sooner, but the court recognized
as a conflicting duty, the duty the railroad had to its passengers,'7
a view with support in at least one leading flood damage case.'
8
14. Many of these cases are collected in Key Sales Co. v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas Co., 290 F. Supp. 8 (D.S.C. 1968).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 24-25.
17. Lucchese v. San Francisco-Sacramento R.R., 106 Cal. App. 242, 289
P. 188 (1930).
18. Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384, 1386 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (plaintiffs complaining of flood damage during the period of
release of waters retained to cut peak flows were not entitled to re-
cover; the operator's acts caused "little injury in comparison with far
greater benefits conferred"; quoting from United States v. Sponen-
barger, 308 U.S. 256, 267 (1939)).
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Other lines of cases involving factually dissimilar situations
should not be ignored. Despite cases like Key Sales which collect
and rely on other flood damage cases, the majority of the decisions
involving flood damages from dam operation tend to cite and rely
upon negligence cases generally, rather than looking to flood dam-
age cases for guidance.
If, as the holding in Utah Power suggests, there is a duty to
draw down a reservoir in excess of previous drawdowns when heavy
runoffs are expected, and there is no right to allow flood waters
coming to pass through, there will be instances when the natural
flow is exceeded as the reservoir is drawn down to provide storage
for an anticipated heavy runoff, or when it is later drawn down.
In Graham v. City of Springfield,19 even though an engineer testi-
fied that the drawdown had begun when the rains commenced, the
court characterized his testimony as unsatisfactory, and held that
it was reasonable to find negligence when a reservoir is drawn
down. That is, it may be negligent to release more water than is
entering the reservior.
City of Springfield is similar to Utah Power in that in both cases
downstream farmers had planted flood prone lands and lost crops
due to the increased flows. The difference is that in Utah Power
the crop loss was caused by a flow through of the high runoff, while
in City of Springfield, the loss was caused by a higher level that
resulted from the efforts to cut the crest, even though the crest
was actually cut. For operators this creates an interesting dilemma.
Utah Power suggests that liability can grow out of not drawing
down the reservoir to create storage, while City of Springfield sug-
gests it may be negligent to draw down a reservoir to create storage!
Similar to City of Springfield is Arkansas Power & Light Co.
v. Cash.20 In Cash, farmers complained that mismanagement of
the defendant's reservoirs caused flood waters to remain on their
crop lands for forty to forty-five hours when a flow through of
the crest would have lasted only a short time. Citing evidence that
the damage could have occurred in ten or twelve hours, the court
reversed the verdict for the crop owners on the grounds that the
evidence did not show the acts of the defendant actually caused
the damage. While the decision on causation saved the defendant,
there is another possible explanation for the result. It was sug-
gested in the dissenting opinion, which urged that the verdict
should stand, that the reservoir manager had two options: "[lilt
19. 23 Ill. App. 3d 427, 319 N.E.2d 252 (1974). Compare Ark-Mo Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. C1. 1976).
20. 245 Ark. 459, 432 S.W.2d 853 (1968).
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could release from the reservoir in the same volume and over the
same period in which it fell, thereby permitting a higher, faster and
possibly more devastating flood ... or it could release less water
S.. and [then] more water ... thus ... maintaining [the flow]
over a longer period of time."'21 The dissent suggested that the
defendant was the actor who chose which course of action to follow,
and, therefore, was responsible for the damage. This denies the con-
cept of correlative duties, or duties to others than the immediate
plaintiffs. One possible explanation for the majority finding the
evidence of causation insufficient was that the choice made by the
defendant, when confronted with the alternatives posed by the dis-
sent, was a reasonable, responsible choice. If there must be a choice
between crop damage or a risk to lives from a higher and faster
flood, the choice made by the defendant may have been reasonable.
The dissent's argument comes close to stating the argument against
liability, unless it could be said that the decision to erect the reser-
voir was negligent in that the inevitability of the choice was or
should have been anticipated.
B. Duty to Warn and Contributory Fault
If the cases are characterized as cases involving the negligent
operation of structures and the plaintiffs are characterized as down-
stream owners who plant or otherwise use flood prone lands, the
issue of contributory or comparative fault of the plaintiffs is then
raised. In Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 22 a suit
in which the plaintiff stored automobiles on flood prone lands, the
court addressed the issue of contributory negligence and the doc-
trine of avoidable consequences. That part of the opinion which
stressed the duties of the manager of the structure controlling the
flow of waters to the plaintiff, and especially stressed the duty to
warn of the danger, suggests that if the manager fails to warn of
increased releases, the plaintiff's contributory fault may be excused
under a causation analysis similar to that underlying the last clear
chance doctrine. 23 The failure to warn could be the sole cause, and
the contributory fault of the plaintiff in using the flood prone area
21. Id. at 475, 432 S.W.2d at 861 (Jones, J., dissenting).
22. 499 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1974). The duty of the operator to warn of
releases from structures is further explored in Chrysler Corp. v. Dallas
Power & Light Co., 522 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (reversing
a summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the fact that
the operator was not responsible for the heavy run" off which led to
the releases did not preclude the existence of a duty to warn lower
owners that a large volume of waters would be released through the
dam). But see note 50 infra.
23. The dissenting opinion in Dougherty v. California-Pacific Util. Co.,
326 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
not a legal cause, although the need for such a humanitarian rule
as last clear chance seems slight when the plaintiff is a major auto
manufacturer as was the case in Ford Motor. In another case,
the failure of a plaintiff to erect protective structures has been held
to be contributory negligence.
24
The duty of the operator of a retention structure to warn of
the danger as stated in Ford Motor may be limited to cases in which
the user of the flood prone lands calls the operator and asks for
information about possible flooding. At the least, Ford Motor sug-
gests that the duty is strongest in such circumstances. Practical
problems could arise if the duty to warn is not limited in some
way. Even the manufacturer of a product with duties to warn
seems to have a better chance to meet that duty than the operator
of a structure suddenly confronted with weather reports predicting
a heavy runoff in the watershed. It is also as likely that weather
predictions could be available to the persons interested, although,
as anyone who has ever planned a picnic knows, they do not guar-
antee what is predicted, and often are stated as a probability rather
than a flat prediction.
C. Feasibility and Foreseeability
The analogy of the operator of a water retention structure to
the product manufacturer cannot only be seen in the argument that
both have duties to warn of impending dangers, but can also be
seen in that both may deal with the issue of whether a certain action
is feasible. Although the issue in Rylands v. Fletcher2 5 is beyond
the scope of this commentary, the cases which allow recovery based
on defective design of structures, such as the design and capacity of
the spillway in Barr v. Game, Fish & Parks Commission20 and Dye
v. Burdick,27 may go to the issue of feasibility, that is, whether it
is feasible to build and design spillways with the capacity necessary
to handle extremely heavy runoffs. Cases such as Bowling v. City
of Oxford,28 in which evidence of leaks preceding the breaking of
an earthen dam were sufficient to warrant the reversal of a nonsuit,
seem analogous to defective product cases in the area of products
liability.
546 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah 1976), refers to this rationale as use of a
"back handed last clear chance." See note 41 and accompanying text
infra.
24. Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972).
25. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
26. 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. App. 1972).
27. - Ark. -, 553 S.W.2d 833 (1977).
28. 267 N.C. 552, 148 S.E.2d 624 (1966). See Curtis v. Dewey, 93 Idaho
847, 475 P.2d 808 (1970).
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The traditional defense for operators has been the Act of God
doctrine. This doctrine continues to have application where the
rainfall is twice the maximum rainfall expected in 100 years.29 But
to state the case in which the doctrine can be used is to describe
its limitations. The duty of foreseeability described in Diamond
Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors,3" undercuts the
Act of God doctrine, unless the negligence is governmental and
thus immunized. 31
It was suggested above 32 that the design of a structure, espe-
cially its spillway, may require some appraisal of the foreseeable
runoff into the reservoir as a test of the sufficiency of the design.
Virtually all the cases cited-up to this point have dealt with the
issue of whether the management of flows was reasonable in view
of the anticipated runoff. But to state the case as Ford Motor does,
sweeping all the issues into the ultimate one of reasonableness, and
citing the Restatement of Torts,33 is to leave the manager of the
structure and the downstream owners with little or no guidance.
Every time the operation of a water retention structure succeeds
in skimming crests of floods the downstream owners can say they
relied on there being no future floods. Yet the downstream owners
use of the flood prone lands may create a risk of damages as fore-
seeable by them as by the operator of the structure. Under these
circumstances if damage occurs, litigation is inevitable. When there
are such damages and lower owners are "passive," the chances are
that the tendency of courts noted by Grant Gilmore,3 4 to shift losses
from passive to active sectors of society, will come into play and
29. Frank v. County of Mercer, 186 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1971) (Act of God
defense successfully asserted by defendant in suit alleging bridge and
abutments were negligently constructed).
30. 16 Cal. App. 3d 581, 94 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1971).
31. McClaskey v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 912 (D. Ore. 1966). But see
Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
Cf. Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 253 N.W.2d 240 (1977)(governmental immunity does not reach the operation of the struc-
ture).
32. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
33. RESTATMENT OF TORTS § 825, Comment a (1938) (intentional invasion
defined) (quoted in Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 499
F.2d 400, 410 (5th Cir. 1974)).
34. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Cmi. L. REv. 103(1970), describes a shift to give relief to passive parties against active
parties as a process in which plaintiffs barred from recovery under
contract doctrines shift to more open tort doctrines to gain relief. Per-
haps cases such as Utah Power show a shift to tort from property
as well as contract (at least as far as the plaintiffs who gave flowage
easements were concerned) in order to fashion a remedy for those
who want to use flood prone areas free of the risks of flooding.
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relief may be granted on the active-passive distinction and not neg-
ligence.
One of the most interesting cases that may be explained by the
"active-passive" theory involved home owners on flood prone lands
who recovered from overflows of irrigation canals. In Salt River
Valley Water Users Association v. Giglio,3 5 homeowners who pur-
chased houses in a floodplain sought and recovered damages using
the theory that inadequate spillways were provided for irrigation
canals thus causing flooding. The case involved an unusual rainfall
of the magnitude of a 100 year storm, yet this fact apparently
played no part in the decision. From a tort point of view the issue
of foreseeability appears to have been submerged in the issue of
feasibility, for example, in the failure to provide adequate spillways.
The case is of interest in the area of land use, because the defend-
ant who acquired the canals also acquired liability for their main-
tenance, but the homeowners did not have to bear the responsibility
for placing their houses in the floodplain. The theory of vicarious
responsibility which seems to apply where a defendant acquires a
structure, arguably suggests that if the builder of the home could
not be joined as a defendant, 36 then the plaintiffs should be re-
quired to bear the fault of their predecessor in title.
In a search for standards for the management of flows from a
structure located where heavy runoffs can occur, the focus of the
courts on the broad standard of reasonable care and the determina-
tion that it is feasible to completely draw down a given structure
though it might increase rates to electric consumers, 37 suggests an-
other tort analogy. Doctors have long been held to the standards
of their profession, perhaps first in their own locality, and then
over a broader area.3 8  Perhaps a rational standard for the man-
agers of water structures should be that of their professional
counterparts, especially those in their own area. With the power
of hindsight, the plaintiff in Utah Power could have alleged that
other actions might have been taken; but the issue was negligence,
and not feasibility, as in products liability. If the issue is reason-
ableness of operation and not feasibility,3 9 the testimony of other
managers40 would offer a guide in the search for standards.
35. 113 Ariz. 190, 549 P.2d 162 (1976).
36. Id.
37. See Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 549 (1959).
39. For a thoughtful consideration of the definition of feasibility, see Phil-
lips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Product Liability,
46 U. Cnr. L. REv. 101 (1977).
40. Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in The Trial of Negligence Is-
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A case superficially similar to Utah Power, which involved the
duty to draw down to prevent flooding caused by a heavy runoff
of surface waters into a power company canal, merits comparison.
In Dougherty v. California-Pacific Utilities Co.,41 the court af-
firmed a recovery of $896.27 for flooding damages, applying what
appeared to be a test of feasibility. In Dougherty it was possible
to draw down the canal that flooded, and this possibility was cited
to uphold the verdict. The concurring opinion called the majority's
action the "pulling [of] a reasonable prudent rabbit out of a judicial.
top hat,"42 but it is possible that the concurring judge was noting
that the majority shifted to a test of feasibility in a situation that
should have been governed by "reasonableness." This would be
consistent with the conclusion of the dissent that there was not
only no negligence, but no causation.43 At the least, the dissent
raises the question of what standards should apply-reasonableness,
or failure to do what is feasible. There might well be cases in which
lay testimony and the reasonable prudent juror can conclude that
it is negligent to draw down a reservoir when water is not enter-
ing it, as was suggested in City of Springfield. However, noted
in that opinion was the absence of expert testimony from others
responsible for water management in the area. Testimony that the
acts of the operator in Utah Power fell below the customary stand-
ard of care should have had the effect of giving pause to the second
guessing by downstream owners who argued that the sole responsi-
bility of the operator is toward them. Even in structures built by
the Corps of Engineers for the primary purpose of flood control,
the demands of recreational users that the pool be raised for recrea-
tional uses involve a difficult decision as to exactly where that
level should lie so that both interests can be accommodated.
The complaints by plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions
about the dangers of a professional standard also apply to any sug-
gestion that the acts of operators should be tested by a professional
standard, especially a locality standard. However, such a guideline
for the jury would focus the issue of negligence in operation far
better than the broad standard of care in the ordinary charge,
where damage from one method of fixing discharges almost implies
that there is a duty to have used the other alternative, or some
other alternative.
sues, 26 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1947). See also Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (impact of unchallenged evidence
of government's expert).
41. 546 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976).
42. Id. at 884 (Henroid, C.J., concurring).
43. Id. (Ellett, J., dissenting).
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In the search for ordinary tort analogies, especially where the
force that causes the injury comes from nature, the second-colli-
sion cases will inevitably be looked to for guidance.4 4 Perhaps the
apportionment of damages among the various sources of harm in
proportion to respective degrees of fault and causation suggests a
method of attempting to make the measure of true damage attri-
buted to the operator more realistic. Johnson & Johnson v. Dun-
dass, 45 held that a defendant adding to the waters of a stream al-
ready overflowing its banks, was justly held liable for only thirty
percent of the damages. 46
A final aspect of Utah Power is that the court held that even
those lower owners who had given flowage easements to the utility
company were entitled to damages for negligent flooding. Many
scholars are concerned with the possibility that some of the risks
of expanded duties of "care" in the broadest possible sense create
risks of expansions in the number and size of claims and are con-
sidering the ways that such claims can be limited by contract.47
The holding of Utah Power bars the freedom to contract for limita-
tions of liability.
Faced with the same problem, whether a flowage easement pur-
chased by an operator of a structure from a lower owner later
flooded is a defense to a charge of negligent flooding, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court 48 remanded the issue. The answer of
Utah Power may be too facile. It would appear to allow the lower
owner to obtain money damages for flooding or flowage easements,
then to jump on the bandwagon of reliance on the structure not
flooding to obtain more money. The primary objection to Utah
Power is that it cuts the ground from under any negotiated attempt
to restrict the exposure of the operator of the structure. Further,
if it can be assumed that the seller of a flowage easement has re-
ceived a payment based in part on loss of value due to the fact
that crops easily damaged by overflows cannot be grown, recovery
by the owner of the lands subject to the flowage easement or flood
damages for loss of crops planted in lands subject to the easement
44. Huddel v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), might be referred to
when considering the problem of ultimate responsibility for preventing
injury in the event another force initiates the series of events that
culminate in an injury, allegedly through the fault of an intermediary.
45. [1945] 4 D.L.R. 624.
46. See Street, Supervening Events and the Quantum of Damages, 78 L.Q.
REv. 70 (1962).
47. O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort,
75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977).
48. Moulton v. Groveton Paper Co., 112 N.H. 50, 289 A.2d 68 (1972).
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is but another example of the "dog-in-the-manger" 49 aspect of water
law. It seems inconsistent to require condemnation of lands to be
flooded and then permit the owner of such lands to sue for neg-
ligent flood damage.
III. CONCLUSION
The easiest standard for flood damage cases brought against the
operators of water retention structures would be that of the natural
flow. Yet given that any operator of a retention structure has
power to act, that power brings forth a duty to act.50 In the search
for a generalized guide to the resolution of all tort actions it is then
easy to sweep the cases into the generalized duty of reasonable care.
If the natural flow of the stream helps set the minimum flows and
operators are obliged to pass along, then the natural flow of a
stream, including freshlets and occasional heavy runoffs, should
play a role in fixing a permissible maximum flow. The reasonable
duty of the operator might be to cut the crest, or distribute the
higher flow over a longer period, but courts should take care not
to demand that the crest be cut and higher than normal release
not be made at other times. Further, the test of reasonableness
should not become a test of whether it was feasible to avoid passing
along some higher than normal flows by saying it was possible to
have provided storage capacity and made alternate release patterns.
Perhaps the standard for water structure management should be
that of other professionals in the area. The engineer responsible
for streamflow management is no less a professional than the doctor
treating a patient. Further, the Restatement indicates that it is
general knowledge that heavy rainstorms produce floods in moun-
tain streams.51 In such cases the liability for damages should be
apportioned, and such general knowledge should bear on whether
an operator of a water retention structure has a duty to warn
others.
49. The characterization "dog-in-the-manger" comes from United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 751 (1950) (downstream own-
ers sued for loss of rights to receive flood waters on their flood prone
lands).
50. There may be statutory regulations of drawdowns. In Maine the Soil
and Water Conservation Commission, either on its own motion or by
petition, may conduct public hearings to establish normal water levels.
ME. Rv. STAT. tit. 12, § 304.1 (Supp. 1977). See also id. § 304.4 (pro-
viding that the order requiring maintenance of a stable level "shall
include provision for variations in water level to permit sufficient
draw down ... to accommodate precipitation and runoff").
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290, Comment e (1965): "Every
man should realize that heavy rainstorms are likely to produce floods
in mountain streams."
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Finally, the mechanical view of Utah Power that one cannot con-
tract against the effect of his own negligence needs to be recon-
sidered. Had the plaintiffs in Utah Power proceeded on a "taking"
theory the plaintiffs who did not give flowage easements might well
have lost 52 but those who did give flowage easements unquestion-
ably would have lost.5
3
52. See Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
53. But see City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d
231 (1973) (directed verdict for condemning authority reversed and
condemnees allowed to proceed on cross action for flood damages on
a negligence theory).
